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Abstract
Introduction: General aviation missions related to furtherance of business potentially carry higher risk (operations in adverse weather,
at night, for longer distances) than those undertaken for recreation. The study herein was undertaken to determine fatal accident rates,
proportions, and risk factors/causes.
Method: The National Transportation Safety Board aviation accident database was queried for accidents (1996–2015). Annual fleet times
were from the general aviation annual activity survey. Statistical analyses used Poisson distributions, proportion testing, and Cohen’s Kappa tests.
Results: The fatal accident rate for business operations was three- to six-fold lower than the rate for recreational flights with a decline evident
between 1996 and 2015. However, a higher proportion of business-related accidents were fatal (33%) compared with recreational flight mishaps
(22%). Business-related, fatal accidents were over-represented for operations of longer flight distance, non-daylight hours, and degraded
visibility. The most frequent accident cause categories were a deficiency in pilot skills/experience/systems knowledge (45%) and violation of the
federal aviation regulations (e.g. departure into instrument conditions without an instrument flight plan, flight into known/forecast icing) (26%).
Conclusion: Despite the fatal accident rate declining for business-related missions, the proportion of fatal mishaps was higher than that
for recreational flights.
Practical application: Towards enhancing safety (a) flight reviews should discuss alternate flight planning to circumvent the hazards
of night operations, adverse weather, and fatigue, (b) pilots should be encouraged to participate in additional training, e.g. the FAAST
program, and (c) pilots should avail themselves of aviation training devices for maintaining instrument proficiency.
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Introduction
General aviation (nonrevenue) represents the largest
sector of civil aviation and is mostly comprised of piston-
engine-powered aircraft (Federal Aviation Administration
[FAA], 2015). It includes all flight operations except for
scheduled commercial services and the military (FAA,
2015). Such operations and pilot flight checks are regulated
by a set of rules set forth in the code of federal regulations
(14 CFR Parts 91 and 61.56) (Electronic Code of Federal
Regulation, 2015a, 2018). In contrast, operations and pilot
re-currency training by commercial entities such as air car-
riers are governed by a more restrictive set of rules (14 CFR
Parts 121 and 135) (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation,
2017c). Moreover, transport category aircraft used by air
carriers are certificated to higher safety standards (with
respect to redundant systems) (Electronic Code of Federal
Regulation, 2017b). Also, organizational safety manage-
ment systems, while mandatory for air carriers, are rare for
general aviation (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation,
2017a). Partly for these reasons, commercial travel is much
safer than general aviation, with the latter accounting for
94% of civil aviation fatalities in the USA (Boyd, 2017).
In addition to the loss of life, general aviation accidents
also impose a substantial financial burden carrying annual
costs of $1.6–4.6 billion in the USA (Sobieralski, 2013).
Whilst the majority of general aviation operations are for
recreational purposes (also referred to as personal/private)
and hence discretionary, a subset of operations are conduc-
ted for the furtherance of business (FAA, 2015). Herein, the
term ‘‘business’’ (also referred to as ‘‘commerce’’) excludes
operations involving aerial observations, flight instruction,
skydiving, ferry flights, banner tows, corporate flights, and
public utility.
Due to a fixed schedule often associated with conducting
business, these types of missions may necessitate operating
in degraded weather (limited visibility), at night, and over
longer distances with increased exposure to these accident
risk factors (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Groff & Price,
2006; Li & Baker, 1999). Furthermore, general aviation
rules do not limit maximum duty times (in contrast with
airline operations; Electronic Code of Federal Regulation,
2012) nor do they educate pilots as to the perils of fatigue
affecting safe operations as might occur after a long busi-
ness day. Also noteworthy is that an individual’s propensity
to take on risk increases with the opportunity for gain
(Hunter, 2002) as might be the case with fast-moving busi-
ness activities. Certainly, this was evident for medical pas-
senger air transport which showed a higher fatal outcome
than that not involving such activity (Bledsoe & Smith,
2004; Blumen et al., 2002; Handel & Yackel, 2011).
Notwithstanding the potential for greater risk for mis-
sions conducted in the furtherance of business, two major
changes in general aviation over the last two decades could
provide a bulwark against such elevated risk. First, the
inclusion of scenario-based training (FAA, 2013, 2017b)
designed to manage real-world challenges, risk manage-
ment, and single pilot resources into ab initio training and
flight reviews has been encouraged for well over a decade.
Second, a surge in the availability of in-flight, near-real-time
weather (depicting for example convective activity, airport
visibility conditions) transmitted from satellite and ground-
based facilities has been evident over a similar period
(FAA, 2015).
To the best of our knowledge, no research has been
undertaken to investigate the safety of general aviation
operations conducted for the purpose of business travel.
Accordingly, we undertook a study to determine the fatal
accident rate, the proportion of fatal mishaps, and risk factors/
causes (1996–2015) involving piston-powered general avia-
tion aircraft operated for the furtherance of business under
14 CFR Part 91.
Methods
Accident Data Source
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
aviation accident Access database (August 1, 2017 release)
(NTSB, 2015) was queried for accidents occurring over the
period spanning 1996–2015 involving single reciprocating
engine-powered (4–6 seat capacity) airplanes (,12,501 lbs)
operated under 14CFR 91 regulations (Electronic Code of
Federal Regulation, 2015a) for the purpose of business (but
excluding the following operations: aerial observations,
flight instruction, public utility, skydiving, ferry, banner
tow, and corporate flights) or personal/private (also refer-
red to herein as recreational) missions. Homebuilt aircraft,
accidents in Alaska, or those occurring with specific
aircraft (Helio, Courier, Maule, Stinson, PZLs, and Piper
PA 20/22s) typically operated from unimproved surfaces
were all excluded. Mishaps in non-moving or taxiing
aircraft or in which the pilot in command was a profes-
sional employed for his/her services were also excluded
from the study. The database provides pilot parameters
such as certification, total time and time-in-type, and injury
severity outcome in the final report. Accident causes were
categorized (Boyd & Stolzer, 2015) using information from
the NTSB final report.
For fatal airline accidents, the NTSB database was
searched for mishaps in the contiguous USA involving
domestic carriers operating under 14CFR 121 for the period
spanning 2011–2015.
Fleet Activity
For general aviation, total fleet times (hours) for business
or personal/private missions were from the general aviation
annual activity survey (FAA, 2015) using data correspond-
ing to single engine, fixed wing aircraft. Fleet activity for
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2011 was interpolated from data for the years 2010 and
2012. The U.S. Air Carrier Traffic Statistics (Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, 2017) was queried for revenue
aircraft hours operated by domestic operators for the
period spanning 2011–2015.
Distances Between Airports for Accident Flights
Latitude and longitude coordinates for departure and
arrival airports were obtained from the FAA airport data
and contact website (FAA, 2017a). Distances (direct)
between these airport pairs were determined using a
haversine mathematical function (Korn & Korn, 2000)
which calculates the great-circle distance across the
earth’s surface given two coordinates.
Statistical Analyses
A generalized linear model with Poisson distribution was
employed to determine if a change in the accident rate was
statistically significant using the initial period as referent
(Dobson & Barnett, 2008). Total fleet times (hours) were
summed for the specified period and the natural log of the
summed fleet activities used as an offset.
Proportion testing used contingency tables and a Pearson
Chi-Square (2-sided) test to determine where there were
statistical differences (Field, 2009).
Normality testing of continuous data was performed
using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (Field, 2009). A value
of p , 0.05 was indicative of non-normal distributed data
(Field, 2009). Non-Gaussian data were rank-ordered, binned
into low, middle, and upper groups, and proportion tested
against fatal/nonfatal accident counts.
Fatal accident causes were categorized independently by
authors (D.B./S.B.) and inter-rater reliability determined
using a Cohen’s Kappa test. Disagreement in category
assignment was resolved by discussion between both
investigators.
All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS (v24)
software. A value of p , 0.05 was used as cutoff for stati-
stical significance.
Results
Temporal Trends in Fatal Accident Rate
Operations conducted for the furtherance of commerce
potentially carry additional risks (e.g. flights in degraded
weather, at night, over longer distances (Bazargan & Guzhva,
2011; Li & Baker, 1999; Rostykus, Cummings, & Mueller,
1998) necessitated by a fixed schedule) when compared
with recreational flights which are discretionary in nature.
Consequently, we first compared the fatal accident rates
for general aviation airplanes operated under 14CFR 91 for
the furtherance of business (Figure 1) with the corresponding
rate for operations undertaken for recreational purposes
(referred to as personal missions by the NTSB). Surprisingly,
the fatal accident rate for business operations varied between
three- and six-fold (across the four periods) lower than the
corresponding rate for recreational flights. For the initial
period (1996–2000) the rate of fatal accidents was 3.4 (per
million flight hours) for business operations and 10.1 for
recreational flights. Although both fatal accident rates were
unchanged for the subsequent time period (2001–2005),
a statistical decline was evident thereafter using the initial
period as referent.
Figure 1. Fatal accident rate for general aviation flights undertaken for furtherance of business or recreational purposes. Fatal accident rates are shown.
The rate was calculated using the general aviation fleet time categorized as for the purpose of business or personal/private (recreational) missions summed
across the specified period. Parameter n is the accident count for the indicated period. For each group (business or recreational), a Poisson distribution was
used to test for differences in fatal accident rate using the initial period (1996–2000) as referent. *p 5 0.024; **p 5 0.009; ***p , 0.001.
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The decline in fatal accident rates for both types of
general aviation operations (recreational and business)
should nevertheless be put into perspective. Thus, the busi-
ness fatal accident rate, lowest for the most recent period
(2011–2015), was still elevated 38-fold in comparison with
fatal airline mishaps (14CFR 121) incurred by domestic
carriers over the corresponding period.
Business Missions Carry a Higher Proportion of Fatal
Accidents
The proportion of mishaps with a fatal outcome was then
compared for operations conducted for either recreation
or commerce. Of 6,041 general aviation accidents (fatal and
nonfatal combined) identified as recreational and occurring
over the study period, 22% were fatal (Figure 2). In con-
trast, a higher proportion (33%) of fatal mishaps was evi-
dent for general aviation operations conducted for the
furtherance of business. This over-representation of fatal
accidents for business-related missions was statistically sig-
nificant (p , 0.001). Thus, although the fatal accident rate
was lower for business operations than the corresponding
rate for recreational flights, the proportion of mishaps for
which an occupant(s) perished was higher.
Comparison of Flight Histories/Pilot Certification for
Fatal Accidents Undertaken for Recreation or Furtherance
of Commerce
As stated above, the lower fatal accident rate (Figure 1)
for flights undertaken for business missions was surprising.
Towards explaining this finding, flight history and pilot
certification were compared for both groups of accident
pilots as advanced certification and greater flight experi-
ence have been previously reported as enhancing general
aviation safety (Li, Baker, Grabowski, & Rebok, 2001; Li,
Baker, Quiang, Grabowski, & McCarthy, 2005). Indeed,
pilots involved in flights for the furtherance of business
had more experience as evident by a two-fold greater total
flight time (Table 1). In a similar vein, a larger percentage
(73 versus 51%) of pilots operating with a business mission
held an instrument rating. Conversely, the overwhelming
majority (71–79%) of pilots involved in accidents for both
types of missions held private pilot certifications rather than
advanced ratings.
Risk Factors and Accident Causes for Fatal Accidents
Undertaken for the Furtherance of Business
Considering the higher proportion of fatal accidents for
flights in pursuance of commercial activities, we then sought
to identify risk factors and accident causes for such mishaps.
Previous studies (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007, 2011; Boyd,
2015) have identified several risk factors (e.g. degraded
visibility, night operations, flight distance) for a fatal out-
come of a general aviation accident. Indeed, flights planned
with a longer distance or during non-daylight hours were
over-represented for fatal outcome (Table 2). Likewise,
there was a disproportionate number of fatal accidents for
operations in degraded visibility (i.e. instrument condi-
tions). Interestingly, of 40 accident flights in instrument
conditions, while 34 involved instrument flight rules (IFR)-
rated pilots, only 25 were operating on an IFR flight plan.
An accident cause category was then assigned to fatal
mishaps involving general aviation flights undertaken for a
business-related mission as described previously (Boyd &
Figure 2. Comparison of the proportion of fatal accidents for flights conducted for the furtherance of business with those undertaken for personal/private
missions. Shown are fatal and nonfatal accident counts (n) for flights conducted for business or personal/private missions determined for the period
spanning 1996–2015. Proportion testing was with a Chi-Square test.
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Stolzer, 2015) and in Table 3. In some instances, categories
were aggregated. Of 85 fatal accidents, a NTSB accident
cause was determined for 74 mishaps. Each accident was
reviewed independently by two of the authors (D.B./S.B.)
based on information in the NTSB final report. A high
agreement in accident category assignment was evident
between both researchers (Cohen’s Kappa 5 0.915). The
most common accident cause category (45%) was a defi-
ciency in pilot skills/experience/systems knowledge fol-
lowed by violation of the federal aviation regulations (FARs)
(26%) per the code of 14CFR 91 (Figure 3).
The ‘‘deficient pilot skills/experience/systems knowl-
edge’’ category of accidents was subcategorized (Table 4).
The overwhelming number of accidents aggregated into
either poor basic stick and rudder skills (42%) or instrument
proficiency (42%). A similar strategy undertaken for fatal
accidents involving regulatory FAR violations (Table 5)
showed that intentional continued flight into instrument
conditions by pilots lacking an instrument rating (or out
of currency) represented the most prevalent subcategory
of FAR violations (37% of accidents). Departure into
instrument conditions without an instrument flight plan
(21%) or flight into known and/or forecast icing per 14CFR
91.13 (21%) represented the next two most common
subcategories of FARs violations.
Discussion
Herein, we report the surprising finding of a lower fatal
accident rate for general aviation operations conducted in
pursuance of business when compared with the correspond-
ing rate for recreational flights for the 1996–2015 period.
This encouraging finding should however be put into
context. First, the proportion of fatal accidents in furtherance
of business was not only higher than the corresponding
proportion for mishaps involving recreational flights but also
Table 1
Flight history/certification for pilots involved in fatal accidents.
Parameter Mission
Business Recreational
Pilot certification Count (n) 83 1,292
PPL (%) 71 79
Commercial-CFI (%) 22 17
ATP (%) 7 4
Total flight time Count (n) 85 705
Median (hours) 1,008 511
Q1 (hours) 545.6 238
Q3 (hours) 2,300 1,140
Flight time in aircraft make/model Count (n) 49 711
Median (hours) 123 150
Q1 (hours) 75 45
Q3 (hours) 475 418
Instrument-rated Count (n) 85 1,311
Yes (%) 73 51
No (%) 27 49
Notes. Pilot certifications: PPL, private pilot; Commercial-CFI, commercial or certified flight instructor; ATP, airline transport pilot. Instrument-rated is
restricted to pilots holding this rating for airplanes. n, accident count; Q, quartile.
Table 2
Risk factors for fatal accidents for flights undertaken for business-related missions.
Risk factor Group Nonfatal (n) Fatal (n) Chi-Square (2-sided) p value
Planned flight distance Lower third (,122 nm) 60 17 0.028
Middle third (123–258 nm) 45 32
Upper third (.258 nm) 48 29
Lighting Daylight 145 53 0.001
Other-than-daylight 27 29
Visibility Instrument conditions 11 29 ,0.001
Visual conditions 157 53
Notes. Parameters for a fatal outcome for accident flights undertaken with a business mission are shown. For flight distance, accident flights were rank-
ordered based on planned distance, binned into low, middle, and upper groups and proportion tested against fatal/nonfatal accident counts. Instrument
conditions were defined as a horizontal visibility less than 3 statute miles and/or a vertical visibility of less than 1,000 feet above ground level. Visual
conditions were those for which visibility exceeded the stated horizontal and vertical parameters for instrument conditions.
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Table 3
Accident cause categories.
Accident cause category Explanation
Checklist/flight manual not followed Self-explanatory and includes nonadherence to V speeds
Improper/inadequate maintenance/inadequate
inspection
Improper or inadequate maintenance or inadequate inspection by
maintenance facility
Inadequate inflight planning/decision making Self-explanatory
Inadequate preflight planning/inspection/procedure Failure to undertake comprehensive preflight planning or aircraft preflight
inspection or a procedure associated with the latter
Violation of FARs Departure into instrument conditions without an IFR flight plan, intentional
flight into instrument conditions by pilots without instrument rating or out of currency,
flight into known/forecast icing (14CFR 91.13a), nonadherence to 500/1,000 ft above
non/congested area, no use of oxygen above 12,500 ft MSL, descending below
prescribed minimums of instrument approach procedure
Malfunction Excluding those attributed to improper/inadequate maintenance/inspection
Lack experience/systems knowledge Lack of experience or lack of systems knowledge on part of the pilot for the accident aircraft
Pilot skill deficiency Pilot skill (e.g. hand/foot–eye coordination for landing or take-offs), failure to adhere to IAP
vectors, unable to fly plane by reference to instruments, incorrect fuel selector placement,
inadequate visual lookout
Figure 3. Accident cause category for fatal accidents involving flights conducted for furtherance of business. The percentage of mishaps (fatal only) in each
accident category is shown with 100% representing the count. Other, checklist/flight manual not followed, pilot fatigue.
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well above that for general aviation as a whole (Li & Baker,
2007; Neuhaus, Dambier, Glaser, Schwalbe, & Hinkelbein,
2010). Second, it should be emphasized that the safety of
general aviation operations involving business activities
still pales in comparison with airline operations (conducted
under 14CFR 121), the latter showing a 38-fold lower fatal
accident rate. That said, we recognize that a single non-
survivable accident involving a transport category aircraft
could dramatically change such data.
The lower fatal accident rate for general aviation ope-
rations involving the furtherance of business was unex-
pected since a fixed timetable agenda may lead to operating
in degraded weather, at night, over longer distances—all
accident risk factors (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Groff
& Price, 2006; Li & Baker, 1999)—not to mention the
possibility of fatigue. Several possibilities may help explain
this safety disparity. First, based on the accident data, pilots
whose mission was business-related were more experi-
enced in terms of total flight time. Indeed, a prior study
(Li et al., 2005) had reported that general aviation pilots
with less than 500 hours total time were more likely to
be involved in a general aviation accident than those with
in excess of 500 hours. Additionally, the observation that
a greater proportion of pilots operating in pursuit of
commerce activities were instrument-rated would likely
enhance safety for flights in degraded visibility (Groff &
Price, 2006). The possibility that the lower fatal accident
rate was a statistical quirk due to over-reporting of business
time for the general aviation annual survey (FAA, 2015) is
unlikely. In fact, the opposite is more plausible. Thus, for
insurance purposes, the accident risk for an owner-flown
airplane used for business travel is assessed higher by
underwriters (Vilches, 2017) (with an associated increase in
insurance premiums) when compared with aircraft used
solely for personal/private missions. Accordingly, there is a
financial disincentive for pilots to declare business-related
flight time.
Our findings also beg the question as to the reason(s)
underlying the temporal decline in fatal accident rates for
general aviation aircraft operated for business-related
activities (and for that matter those conducted for recrea-
tional purposes) over the twenty-year study period.
A combination of factors may have promoted this downward
trend. First, the FAA Industry Training Standards (FAA,
2013) which place emphasis on managing real-world
challenges including scenario-based training (FAA, 2017b),
risk management, and single pilot resources for both in
ab initio (individuals undergoing primary training) and re-
currency training may have contributed to gains in safety.
Indeed, the introduction of this program circa 2004 precedes
the decrease in fatal accident rates evident thereafter. Second,
an increasing prevalence of onboard portable weather data
(FAA, 2015) may also have reduced fatal mishap rates.
Supporting this latter contention, in a flight simulator study
(Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, & Caddigan, 2016), pilots with por-
table weather data showed higher cognitive engagement,
increased weather situation awareness, and made larger route
deviations from adverse weather compared with pilots
without weather data. Lastly, it is possible that insurance
company dictums regarding simulator/instructional flights
requirements for aircraft owners (which may be more
stringent than the FAA requirements) may also have had a
positive impact on safety.
Our findings regarding risk factors for a fatal accident
for flights whose mission was business-related were much
in line with prior studies. Thus, fatal accidents were over-
represented for flights with a longer planned distance
resonating with an earlier study (O’Hare & Owen, 2002)
reporting that cross-country flights carried a four-fold
higher risk of a fatal outcome compared with non-cross-
country flights. In the context of business flights these
findings also raise the specter of pilot fatigue since pilots
may elect to depart after a day of commerce-related activities.
Table 4





Instrument proficiency 18 18.2
Stick and rudder 67 67.7
Visual lookout 5 5.1
Other 9 9.1
Notes. Instrument proficiency refers to flying the aircraft by sole reference
to the flight instruments. Stick and rudder refers to basic pilot skills in con-
trolling the airplane. Other refers to lack of currency, fuel selector incorrect
position, departure from unimproved surface. n, fatal accident count.
Table 5
Subcategorization of violation of FARs for fatal accidents.
Violation of FARs subcategory Count (n) %
Intentional flight into IMC without IFR certification/out of instrument currency 7 37
Flight into known/forecast icing 4 21
Departure into instrument conditions without IFR flight plan 4 21
Other 4 21
Notes. Instrument conditions (IMC) are as per Table 2. IFR, instrument flight rules. Lack of currency refers to the failure to complete six instrument
approaches and holds in a six-month time frame at the time of the fatal accident. Other includes (i) failure to use supplemental oxygen above 12,500 ft
(MSL), (ii) not maintaining a minimum altitude of 500 or 1,000 ft above nonpopulated and populated areas respectively, (iii) descent below the minimum
descent height or minimum descent altitude as published in an instrument approach procedure. n, fatal accident count.
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Indeed, the majority of accidents (82%) involving flights
undertaken in furtherance of business were on a weekday
and, of these, 35% and 8% departed after 16:00 and at/
before 07:00 hours respectively (local time). Unfor-
tunately, general aviation regulations (14CFR 91) do not
educate pilots as to the insidious perils of fatigue nor do
they prescribe rest limits as mandated for airline crews
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulation, 2012) even
though such operations could be regarded as careless or
reckless under 14CFR 91.13. In addition to the potential
for fatigue, late day departures also invoke the possibility
of night operations which again carry an elevated risk of a
fatal accident outcome as per the current study and prior
reports (Boyd, 2015; Li & Baker, 1999). Finally, and
again consistent with prior reports (Bazargan & Guzhva,
2007; Li & Baker, 1999), operating in degraded visibility
also carried a higher risk of a fatal outcome.
Deficiencies in stick and rudder skills and instrument
skills accounted for the majority of fatal accidents. These
findings could reflect, in part, the relatively infrequent
flight pilot checks for general aviation operations. Under
14CFR 61.56 flight reviews (Electronic Code of Federal
Regulation, 2018), which can be completed in a mini-
mum of one hour air time, are required only once every
24 calendar months. In stark contrast, re-currency training,
required annually for air carrier flight crews, involves
ground school, maneuvers/observations, and line-oriented
flight training (Electronic Code of Federal Regulation,
2015b) typically conducted over a multi-day period. As to
deficiency in instrument skills, the difficulty in maintain-
ing such proficiency has been well recognized for over
30 years and a concern for instrument-rated pilots themselves
(Weislogel, 1983). The last decade has witnessed the market
introduction of relatively affordable advanced aviation train-
ing devices suitable for maintaining such proficiency. Alas,
there are no current data as to the use of such devices by
IFR-rated pilots for maintenance of instrument skills.
Regarding FAR violations as causal for some fatal accident
flights undertaken for business travel, it is likely that a subset
(departure/intended continued flight into instrument con-
ditions without an IFR flight plan or in the absence of the
instrument rating and flight into known/forecast icing)
were motivated by what has been referred to as ‘‘goal
seduction’’ (Bearman, Paletz, & Orasanu, 2009). In that
study involving interviews of 28 pilots as to challenging
flights, the investigators found that unsafe practices were
motivated by a variety of ‘‘strong situations’’ which included
financial pressure and time constraints. We suspect that similar
pressures exist for pilots operating commerce mission-related
flights leading to the aforementioned FAR violations.
The study was not without limitations. First, it was a
retrospective study and, as such, flight history and certi-
fication data used towards explaining the disparity in
fatal accident rates were only available for the accident
population rather than the entire cohort (accident and
non-accident) of pilots. Second, since scenario-based training
in ab initio training and flight reviews is not presently man-
datory and participation rates not monitored, its contribution
to the decline in fatal accident rate is speculative. Finally, we
did not explore the possibility that the higher proportion of
fatal accidents for flights conducted in pursuit of business
activities was a consequence of the use of aircraft with
higher stall speeds translating into greater occupant impact
forces in an accident (Freitas, 2014).
In conclusion, while the fatal accident rate for general
aviation flights undertaken pursuant to business activities
has declined over the last two decades, the proportion of
fatal mishaps is higher than that for recreational flights and
well above that of general aviation as an aggregate (Kenny,
2015; Li & Baker, 2007). Since the cause of such fatal
accidents is attributed, in part, to deficiencies in pilot skills,
pilots should be encouraged to participate in additional
training (e.g. via the FAA Safety Team program) as well as
avail themselves of advanced aviation training devices
towards maintaining instrument proficiency. Equally impor-
tant, flight reviews for pilots who partake in these types of
operations should (i) include a discussion of the safety
hazards of fatigue and night operations (as a consequence
of longer flights and at the end of the day) and (ii) encourage
pilots to incorporate (and invoke) alternate travel options for
weather situations exceeding the capabilities of the pilot/
airframe, two components poorly covered in the present
flight review (FAA, 2018). The aforementioned recommen-
dations could be via integration into a safety management
system shown to be successful in lowering accident risk for
14CFR Part 121/135 operations (International Helicopter
Safety Team, 2009). Indeed, scalable and more simplified
models supporting the owner-operator (International Heli-
copter Safety Team, 2009) could be applicable to 14CFR
Part 91 operations in the furtherance of business, e.g. in risk
management (e.g. fatigue and night operations as per the
findings in the current study).
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